We study the relation among some security parameters for vectorial Boolean functions which prevent attacks on the related block cipher. We focus our study on a recently-introduced security criterion, called weak differential uniformity, which prevents the existence of an undetectable trapdoor based on imprimitive group action. We present some properties of functions with low weak differential uniformity, especially for the case of power functions and 4-bit S-Boxes.
Introduction
Differential and linear attacks are major cryptanalytic tools which apply to most cryptographic algorithms. Therefore, functions which guarantee a high resistance to these attacks have been extensively studied. In particular, those with low differential uniformity and high non-linearity, e.g. Almost Perfect Nonlinear (APN) functions or Almost Bent (AB) functions, have received a lot of attention. Since in the design of a block cipher an invertible S-Box of even dimension is usually needed, there is strong interest in non-linear permutations. However, we know examples of APN permutations in even dimension only for dimension 6, for more details see [6] . For the highly interesting cases of dimension 4 and 8, the cipher designer will certainly use 4-differentially uniform S-Boxes, but she will also look at other security criteria, if applicable, although it is not obvious which. Besides, even a 4-differentially uniform S-Box can hide a trapdoor in the related cipher, if not carefully chosen. Algebraic trapdoors can be very dangerous, especially when they are undetectable [25] .
We are investigating the security criterion introduced recently in [11] , called weak differential uniformity. As shown in [11] , any cipher (with a prescribed structure) possessing a weakly-APN vectorial Boolean function as S-Box cannot be successfully attacked using a trapdoor based on imprimitive group action. Indeed, ciphers suffering from such a trapdoor have been built in [24] and might be used as standards without anyone realizing the trapdoor existence. So, a designer would have advantage in choosing an invertible S-Box which is simultaneously weakly APN and 4-differentially uniform, which exists for dimension 4 and 8 (and actually for any dimension). Results in [11] are generalized on any field in [1] , where again the notion of weakly APN plays an important security role.
In Sect. 2 we recall the attack [24] that can be mounted on an AES-like cipher when an imprimitive group action is present. We recall also how a weakly APN S-Box would make this attack ineffective [11] , motivating thus this security criterion. In Sect. 3 we present some first results on weak differential uniformity. In Sect. 4 we specialize to the case of monomial functions, where we see an interesting connection with the property of having the image of a function derivative as an affine space, which is an unexpected weakness within the underlying algorithms (see for instance [10, 12] ). In Sect. 5 we relate the weak differential uniformity with other algebraic properties of vectorial Boolean functions, in particular with the degrees of both the function components and the function derivative components. We can thus improve some results given in [18] and give a formal proof of Fact 4 in [18] . In Sect. 6, we give some results about the partially bent (quadratic), components of a weakly APN permutation and we note that in even dimension weakly APN functions cannot be partially bent (quadratic), behaving thus as APN functions [23, 26] . In Sect. 7 we give some other properties of vectorial Boolean functions whose derivatives have no constant components, allowing also a deeper understanding of 4-bit S-Boxes.
Cryptographic motivations for studying weak differential uniformity
Most block ciphers used for real-life applications are iterated block ciphers, i.e. obtained by a composition of several key-dependent permutations of the message space called "round functions". Let C be a block cipher, i.e. a set of permutations {ϕ k } k∈K of the message space V , where K is the key space. An interesting problem is determining the properties of the permutation group Γ ∞ (C ) = Γ ∞ generated by the round functions of C that imply weaknesses of the cipher.
A property of Γ ∞ considered undesirable is the imprimitivity. Paterson [24] showed that if this group is imprimitive, then it is possible to embed a trapdoor in the cipher. On the other hand, if the group is primitive no such trapdoor can be inserted. We give the idea of the basic chosen-plaintext attack by Paterson. First we recall what it is an imprimitive group. Let G be a finite group acting transitively on a set V . We will write the action of g ∈ G on an element v ∈ V as vg. A partition B of V is said to be G-invariant if Bg ∈ B, for every B ∈ B and g ∈ G. A partition B is trivial if B = {V } or B = {{v} | v ∈ V }. A non-trivial G-invariant partition B of V is called a block system for the action of G on V . Each B ∈ B is called a block of imprimitivity. G is called imprimitive in its action on V if it admits a block system, otherwise it is called primitive. Now we suppose that Γ ∞ is imprimitive. Let us fix any k ∈ K and let ϕ k ∈ Γ ∞ be the related encryption function. Let B 1 , . . . , B r be a non-trivial block system for the group Γ ∞ . This attack works only if we know an efficient algorithm (block sieving) with input any vector v ∈ V and output the (unique) block B l containing v. The classical case is when the block system is formed by all the cosets of a known vector subspace of V . Paterson gives this trapdoor for a DESlike cipher (for more details on DES see [17] ), but it can be extended to the case of AES-like ciphers. We now describe the attack.
Preprocessing performed ones per key
We choose one plaintext m i in each set B i , obtaining the corresponding ciphertext c i . Then the effect of ϕ k on each block B i is determined,
Real-time processing
Given any ciphertext c, we can compute l such that c ∈ B l via the block sieving. Then, we can find the plaintext m of c by examining the block B l ϕ −1 k .
Attack cost
The preprocessing costs r encryptions. For any intercepted ciphertext, the search for the corresponding plaintext is limited to a block, whose size is
Moreover, a cipher C may have another weakness if Γ ∞ (C ) is of small size, since not every possible permutation of the message space can be realized by the cipher [14, 16] . Attacks on ciphers whose encryptions generate small groups were given in [21] .
In [11] the authors define a class of iterated block ciphers, called translation based ciphers ([11] , Definition 3.1), large enough to include many common ciphers (as AES [15] , SERPENT [2] and PRESENT [5] ), and provide some conditions on the S-Boxes of these ciphers that guarantee the primitivity of Γ ∞ . In particular, in Theorem 4.4 of [11] , it is proved that if C is a translation based cipher such that any S-Box satisfies, for some integer r , -The weak 2 r -differential uniformity (see Definition 2 in the next section), and -The strongly r -anti-invariance (it means that no S-Box of C sends a proper subspace of codimension l of the plaintext space to another proper subspace of codimension l),
In Theorem 2 of [12] , under the same hypotheses plus an additional cryptographic assumption, i.e. none of the images of the derivatives of any S-Box is a coset of a linear subspace of the message space, it is proved that Γ ∞ is the alternating group, and so, in other words, Γ ∞ is huge.
Starting from these cryptographic motivations, in [18] the authors provide a deep analysis of 4-bit vectorial Boolean functions focusing on the weak differential uniformity. They determine several conditions, computational and theoretical, which are either sufficient or necessary for a 4-bit vectorial Boolean function to be weakly 2-differential uniform (weakly APN). Moreover they consider two nonlinearity measures,n( f ) and n i ( f ) where f is a vectorial Boolean function (see Sect. 5), and they give some relations between such measures and the weakly APNness.
If the image of a derivative of an S-Box of a cipher C is an affine space then this can be another weakness of C . For example, in the yet unpublished PhD Thesis [7] the author shows how this condition could induce a weakness based on the action of an alternative operation, called hidden sum, for which the vector space structure of the message space is preserved. In [8] some differential properties for permutations in the affine group of the message space with respect to a hidden sum are investigated. In [1] the authors present conditions on the S-box able to prevent a type of trapdoors based on this alternative operation. One of these conditions is that the derivatives of the S-box do not map the space to an affine subspace. Moreover, also for the hash function case, in [10] the authors show an attack on a SHA-3 candidate (Maraca) [20] , which is especially effective when the associated vectorial Boolean function has this feature. In Sect. 4 we will show a sufficient condition for monomial weakly APN vectorial Boolean functions in order to have that none of their derivatives sends the message space to a proper affine subspace (Corollary 2).
Weak differential uniformity
. Any time we write that f is a vBf, we will implicit mean f : F m → F m . When f is also invertible we call it a vBf permutation. We denote the derivative of f byf a (x) = f (x + a) + f (x), where a ∈ F m \{0}, and the image of f by Im(
A notion of non-linearity for S-Boxes that has attracted a lot of research.
The differential uniformity of f is
There is a generalization of differential uniformity presented recently in [11] , which we recall in the following definition.
If f is weakly 2-differential uniform, it is said weakly APN.
As shown in [11] , a δ-differentially uniform map is weakly δ-differential uniform. Moreover the following result holds
Lemma 1 The weak δ-differential uniformity is affine-invariant.
Proof If f is weakly δ-differential uniform and g(x) = D( f (C x + c)) + d, for some m × m matrices C and D with coefficients in F m and for some c, d ∈ F m , then we haveĝ
for any a ∈ F m , and so Im(ĝ a ) = D(Im(f Ca )). Since C and D are permutations, we have that weak δ-differential uniformity is affine-invariant.
Remark 1 In [4]
another non-linearity notion, the locally almost perfect nonlinearity (locally APN), is introduced. Note that, in general, the local-APN property is not equivalent to the weak-APN property. For example, the monomial function x 11 defined over F 6 is weakly APN but it is not locally APN. However, for any dimension there exist Boolean functions that are both locally APN and weakly APN, e.g. the patched inversion.
Remark 2 Suppose that f is not a monomial function. If f is weakly δ-differential uniform then f −1 is not necessarily weakly δ-differential uniform. We provide the following example. We have that f is weakly APN while f −1 is only weakly 4-differential uniform.
We
Remark 2 and the fact that a vBf f is CCZ-equivalent to f −1 imply the following result.
Proposition 1 The weak differential uniformity is not CCZ invariant.
On the other hand, weak differential uniformity behaves well with respect to EA invariance, as shown below.
Proposition 2 The weak differential uniformity is EA invariant.
Proof Let f and g be EA equivalent and let f be weakly δ-differential uniform.
Then
with g affine equivalent to f (and λ is an affinity over F m ).
Since weak differential uniformity is affine invariant, we have |Im(
As seen in Sect. 2, if the image of a derivative of an S-Box is an affine space, then there may be a weakness in the cipher. In this direction the following theorem can be useful. Moreover, in Sect. 4 we prove a stronger result regarding the monomial functions (Corollary 2).
Theorem 1 Let f be a vBf on F m that is weakly APN but not APN. Then, there exists
Proof By contradiction suppose that for any a = 0 we have Im(f a ) = w+W for some w ∈ F m and W vector subspace of F m . Since f is weakly APN, |Im(f a )| > 2 m−2 , thus dim F (W ) = m − 1. Therefore, we have thatf a is a 2-to-1 function for all a = 0, which means f is APN, contradicting our assumption.
Power functions
In this section we focus on monomial functions, also called power functions. In particular we prove that the weak differential uniformity of a function f is equal to that of f −1 , and we show some properties of Im(f a ).
In this section when we write f = x d we mean that f is a power function on F 2 m for any 0 ≤ d ≤ 2 m−1 . We will also identify F 2 m and F m without any further comments.
The following result is well-known (see for instance [3] ).
For any a, a ∈ F m , with a, a = 0, and any 0 ≤ i ≤ 2 m , we have
In other words, the differential characteristics of a monomial function depend only on b.
We denote by ω i the number of output differences of b that occur i times, that is
The differential spectrum of f is the sequence of
Remark 3 Note that if a monomial function f has 2 s -to-1 derivatives then it is weakly
The following lemma is well-known, for instance see Lemma 1 in [3] .
Lemma 3 Let f (x) = x d and g(x)
From Lemma 3 we obtain our first result.
Corollary 1 Let f (x) = x d with gcd(2 m − 1, d) = 1. Then f is weakly δ-differential uniform if and only if f −1 is weakly δ-differential uniform.
Proof For a power function we have
From Lemma 3 we have ω 0 ( f ) = ω 0 ( f −1 ), and this concludes the proof.
Consider the following lemma for a power function (not necessarily a permutation). 
Lemma 4 Let f (x)
W is an F-vector subspace of F m and our claim is proved.
Here we give a sufficient condition for a power function to thwart the aforementioned weakness.
The following result is an obvious consequence of Theorem 1 and Lemma 4.
Corollary 2 Let f be a vBf permutation on F m that is weakly APN but not APN. If
is not a coset of a subspace W ⊆ F m .
Weakly APN functions and degrees of derivatives
Without loss of generality, in the sequel we consider only vBf's such that 
Definition 4 The algebraic degree of a vectorial Boolean function f is the maximal algebraic degree of the coordinate functions of f and is denoted by deg( f ).
We recall the following non-linearity measures, as introduced in [18] :
In other words, n i ( f ) corresponds to the number of component functions of f which are of degree i andn( f ) corresponds to the number of components of the derivative functions of f which are constant. We state two lemmas useful to extend some results of [18] . First, we recall that the algebraic degree of a permutation f (x) = x d is the Hamming weight of the binary representation of d, denoted by w(d). F 3 = {x 1 , . . . , x 8 } and let M a be the matrix of dimension 3 × 8, whose columns are m j =f a (x j ) for 1 ≤ j ≤ 8. We claim thatn( f ) = 0 implies rank(M a ) = 3 for any a. Otherwise, we could obtain (0, . . . , 0) ∈ F 8 from a combination of the rows of M a , and the corresponding component off a would be identically 0.
Proof (i) Let
If f is not weakly APN, we have |Im(f a )| ≤ 2 for some a ∈ F 3 \{0}. So we have at most 2 distinct columns, which implies rank(M a ) ≤ 2 and contradicts rank(M a ) = 3.
(ii) See [18] Proposition 2.
(iii) Let t > 0 be such that gcd(2 2 t+1 −2 2 t +1, 2 m −1) = 1, and consider the power function f (x) = x d , with d = 2 2 t+1 − 2 2 t + 1. By hypothesis gcd(2 t , m) = 2, thus, by Lemma 6, f is 4-differentially uniform and thus weakly 4-differential uniform. Since in our case d = 2 2 t (2 2 t − 1) + 1, then w(d) = w(2 2 t − 1) + 1 which is strictly bigger than 2 for t > 0. So f is not quadratic and then, by Lemma 5,n( f ) = 0.
In [18] it was shown that a weakly APN function f over F 4 has n 3 ( f ) ∈ {12, 14, 15}, moreover by a computer check on the class representatives the authors exclude the case n 3 ( f ) = 12 (Fact 4 in [18] ).
We are now able to provide a formal proof. 
Proposition 3 (Fact
From the theory of quadratic Boolean functions (see for instance [9] )Ŝ a is constant for every a ∈ V (S) where V (S) ⊆ F 4 is a vector subspace, called the set of linear structures of S. It is well-known that V (S) has dimension 0 if and only if S is bent, it has dimension 4 if and only if S is linear (affine), and it has dimension 2 otherwise. Since V (S) is a vector space,
For any i, since f is a permutation, then S i is balanced, so S i is not bent, and then = (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 
Quadratic and partially bent functions Theorem 3 A quadratic function is APN if and only it is weakly APN.
Proof Let f be weakly APN and a = 0 arbitrary. Then by definition, |Im(f a )| > 2 m−2 . Since f is quadratic,f a is affine. Then Im(f a ) is an affine subspace. Hence its size is a power of 2, the only possibility of being equal 2 m−1 . So |Im(f a )| = 2 m−1 for any non-zero a, which means thatf a is 2-to-1 for all non-zero a.
As was shown in [26] there is no APN quadratic permutation over F m for m even, and so, by previous theorem, there is no weakly APN quadratic permutation over F m for m even. This result was extended by Nyberg [23] to the case of permutations with all components partially bent (for m even), in other words there is no APN partially bent permutation. We are able to extend these results by relaxing the condition APN permutations with the condition weakly APN permutation.
Definition 5 ([13])
A Boolean function f is partially bent if there exists a linear subspace V ( f ) of F m such that the restriction of f to V ( f ) is affine and the restriction of f to any complementary subspace U of V ( f ), V ( f ) ⊕ U = F m , is bent. In that case, f can be represented as a direct sum of the restricted functions, i.e., f (y + z) = f (y) + f (z), for all z ∈ V ( f ) and y ∈ U .
Remark 4
The space V ( f ) is formed by the linear structures of f , in fact
where z, a ∈ V ( f ) and y ∈ U . Moreover, since bent function exist only in even Proof Let f be a weakly APN permutation. Assume by contradiction that f has more than
Theorem 4 For m even, a weakly APN permutation has at most
Thus, there exist i and j such that a ∈ V ( f i ) ∩ V ( f j ) with a = 0. This implieŝ n( f ) ≥ 2, which contradicts that f is weakly APN, since in that casen( f ) ≤ 1 ([18] Theorem 1).
From the fact that a quadratic Boolean function is partially bent (see for instance [23] ), we have immediately the following result.
Proposition 4 Let m even. Let f be a weakly APN permutation. Then f has at most
Proof That depends on the fact that the set of components of degree less or equal to 2 is a vector space.
Properties linked ton( f )
In this last part of the paper we give some properties linked to the value ofn( f ) of a vBf. For all a ∈ F m \{0}, let V a be the vector space {v ∈ 
Remark 5
The proposition above gives a sufficient condition, i.e.n( f ) = 0, such that the derivates do not map the message space to an affine subspace; and so a type of trapdoors can be avoided, as noted in Sect. 3.
The following proposition is well-known, but we propose a proof in our context. In Sect. 6 we extend some results known for the (quadratic) partially bent components of an APN permutation to the case of weakly APN permutations.
In the last section we report some other results linked to the value ofn( f ), in particular we prove that this value is zero if and only if the derivates of f do not map the message space to an affine subspace.
